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The possibility of a large-scale biological weapons attack occurring
within the United States is more than merely hypothetical. A number of
'J.D. candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Matthew Meselson et al., Characteristics of Biological and Toxin Weapons, in
POISON IN THE WIND: THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 15, 16-
18 (Gary E. McCuen ed., 1992) (defining biological weapons). Biological weapons consist
of either disease-causing, living microorganisms, or of toxic substances produced by living
organisms. See id. Biological weapons can kill or harm people, animals, or plants; those
containing living microorganisms are particularly dangerous because these living organ-
isms reproduce, spreading the disease throughout populations and ecosystems. See Jona-
than King, All Research Programs Are Offensive, in POISON IN THE WIND: THE SPREAD
OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, supra at 80, 81. These weapons are thou-
sands of times more lethal per unit than any other type of weapon. See James H. Ander-
son, Microbes and Mass Casualties: Defending America Against Bioterrorism, HERITAGE
FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found. Wash. D.C.), May 26, 1998, at 1, 6. Bioter-
rorists can easily elude authorities by disseminating the deadly agents invisibly with aero-
sol devices. See id. at 6. Victims do not show symptoms for hours or days, leaving time for
such terrorists to cover their tracks. See id. Furthermore, because biological weapons
programs can be masked as programs for the production of vaccines, antibiotics, or other
legitimate research, bioterrorists can conceal biological weapons programs easily. See id.
at 8. Scientists have yet to develop effective vaccines against many infectious agents. See
Meselson, supra at 20. Protections for a civilian population against a bioterrorist attack
may include: issuing gas masks; constructing shelters; conducting regular education and
drills for the entire population; massive medical supplies; and fast-response epidemiologi-
cal teams. See id.
2. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 1 (discussing the growing threat and likelihood of
an attack involving the use of biological weapons against the United States); see also The
Threat of Bioterrorism: Assessing the Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous
Biological Agents: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. 14 (1999) [hereinafter House Bioterrorism Hear-
ings] (statement of James S. Reynolds, Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crime Section,
United States Department of Justice). Counterterrorism enforcement officials, numerous
academics, and health care professionals agree that "the most serious form of terrorist
threat confronting the United States relates to the potential use of a biological weapon."
Id. But see Daniel S. Greenberg, The Bioterrorism Panic, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1999, at
A21 (criticizing the federal government for increasing the Department of Health and Hu-
man Service's budget for "bioterrorism preparedness" by $144 million even though there
are no independent assessments of the potential for bioterrorism; noting, however, that
skeptics of the current bioterrorism panic have not gone public because of "the real possi-
bility of events proving them horribly wrong").
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reasons account for the increasing likelihood of this threat.3 First, rapid
growth in the field of genetic engineering, specifically with cloning tech-
nology, has enlarged the number of tools available for biological war-
fare. The growing number of nations that maintain biological weapons
programs has increased the likelihood that terrorists will procure biologi-
cal weapons expertise, possibly through the sponsorship of bioterrorism
by a nation with such capacity.5 Terrorists, as well as disgruntled or de-
ranged individuals, are showing a growing interest in these weapons and
in causing mass fatalities.6 Finally, Russian scientists who worked exten-
3. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 2-9 (listing reasons that the threat of bioterrorism
on United States soil is increasing); Brad Roberts, New Challenges and New Policy Priori-
ties for the 1990s, in BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: WEAPONS OF THE FUTURE? 68, 93 (Brad
Roberts ed., 1993) (reviewing past and future issues surrounding biological warfare, and
noting that, combined, a number of factors increase the likelihood of an attack involving
biological weapons).
4. See 142 CONG. REC. 1863 (1996) (testimony of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah))
(introducing the Biological Agents Enhanced Penalties and Control Act, which was later
enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996). Senator
Hatch urged Congress to pass the Biological Agents Act because new threats, not in exis-
tence when Congress and regulatory agencies drafted current laws, have increased the risk
of bioterrorist attack. See id. An example of these emerging threats is the rapid growth of
genetic technology, which allows scientists to alter microorganisms so that the substances
are more toxic, or more difficult to treat. See id.; see also Robert H. Kupperman & David
M. Smith, Coping with Biological Terrorism, in BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: WEAPONS OF
THE FUTURE?, supra note 3, at 35, 38 (discussing past threats of biological warfare and
terrorism, and evaluating the possible, yet unhelpful defenses to these weapons). Al-
though advances in several fields of science have enhanced human life dramatically, these
breakthroughs, particularly in recombinant DNA technology, have introduced new tools
for warfare. See id.; see also Jeremy Rifkin, Environmental Impact of Biological Weapons
Research, in POISON IN THE WIND: THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS supra note 1, at 101, 102 (arguing that biological weapons programs pose a
threat to the environment and that increasing security at weapons labs, for example, could
minimize the damaging effects of these programs). Advances in genetic engineering tech-
nology also increased the potential for warfare involving biological weapons. See id.
5. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 1. The likelihood that terrorists could gain posses-
sion of biological expertise has increased because approximately 10 nations have biologi-
cal weapons programs. See id. Consequently, these nations may transfer this expertise to
terrorists, directly or indirectly. See id.; see also Biological Weapons: The Threat Posed by
Terrorists: Hearing on Examining Federal Efforts on Dealing with Chemical and Biological
Threats to America Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info. of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 10, 12-13 (1998) [hereinafter Joint Senate Com-
mittee Hearings] (statement of Dr. W. Seth Carus, Visting Defense Fellow, Center for
Nonproliferation Research, National Defense University). In addition, the chances that a
nation with a biological warfare program will support a terrorist with biological weapons
expertise are great. See id. at 12-13. For example, the Department of Defense and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency believe that a number of the nations that have
records of supporting terrorist organizations, such as Libya, North Korea, and Iraq, have
biological warfare programs. See id. at 12.
6. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 13 (statement of James Rey-
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sively on the Soviet Union's massive biological weapons program dis-
persed after that government dissolved, thereby increasing the danger
that other nations and terrorist groups will acquire biological weapons
expertise
Threats of biological weapons attacks are increasingly common and re-
sponse costs are significant.8 Although many of these threats turn out to
be hoaxes,9 continually having to respond to these threats may eventually
desensitize people to the possibility of actual attacks.' ° Furthermore,
these threats disrupt the responding community."
Despite the impending dangers of bioterrorism, naturally occurring in-
fectious diseases are still a bigger threat to the American population.
nolds). The Five-Year Interagency Counter-Terrorism and Technology Plan, submitted to
Congress by Attorney General Janet Reno on December 31, 1998 noted increasing intelli-
gence evidence of terrorist interest in using biological weapons. See id. Over the past few
years, the FBI has encountered a significant increase in the number of cases involving
biological weapons and toxins, which reflects a growing interest in biological agents. See
id.; see also Anderson, supra note 1, at 1-2 (stating that most intelligence analysts once
agreed that terrorists "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead"). How-
ever, recent events, such as the 1995 sarin attack in a Tokyo subway and the 1996 Okla-
homa bombing, contradict this view. See id.
7. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 7-9 (stating that Russia maintained the largest of-
fensive biological weapons program during much of this century); see also House Bioter-
rorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 97, 133-34 (statement of Richard Preston, expert and
author on biological weapons describing the Soviet Union's bioweapons program, called
the Biopreparat, and stating that it would be foolish to deny that scientists left Russia
without bringing their expertise or master seed strains of biological weapons). See gener-
ally Richard Preston, Annals of Warfare: The Bioweaponeers, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 9,
1998, at 52 (interviewing scientists who worked on the Soviet Union's biological weapons
program and later immigrated to the United States).
8. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 17 (statement of Robert M.
Burnham, Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism National Security Division, FBI) (noting
that the number of incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, particularly those
dealing with biological and chemical weapons, has increased steadily and that the cost of
responding to threats of bioterrorism is significant). In the first five months of 1999, the
FBI opened 123 cases involving weapons of mass destruction, 100 of which involved bio-
logical agents. See id. at 19. This is an increase from 37 cases involving weapons of mass
destruction in 1996, 74 weapons of mass destruction cases, 22 of which involved biological
agents in 1997, and 181 cases involving weapons of mass destruction, 112 of which involved
biological agents in 1998. See id. The biological agent cited most often in 1998 and 1999
was anthrax and a rash of anthrax-related threats around the country during that period
affected businesses, schools, hospitals, and courthouses. See id. at 18. Los Angeles esti-
mated that the cost of responding to an onslaught of threats that the city received in the
beginning of 1999 was $1.5 million. See id.
9. See id. Several cases involve "vague or veiled threats, stating only that anthrax
has been released." Id. Other cases involve callers who stated, "in an apparent[ly] non-
threatening manner, that anthrax had been released." Id.
10. See id. at 20.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 51 (prepared statement of Dr. Ronald M. Atlas, Co-Chair, Task Force
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Research on disease prevention and treatment is necessary for the
population's well being. 3 In order to reduce illness and death due to
these diseases, microbiologists and other researchers use dangerous
pathogens as reference cultures. 4 Researchers also use these agents to
increase the nation's medical preparedness against bioterrorsm. Ex-
treme control measures that limit the free exchange of microbial cultures
may drive microbiologists away from important research and thus, ulti-
mately jeopardize the public's health and safety.
6
International laws as well as domestic federal laws and regulations,
currently pertain to the control of biological weapons in the United
States.17 The applicable international laws, which are the 1925 Geneva
Protocol (Protocol) 18 and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC),' 9 have not prevented nations from creating biological weapons. °
These treaties do not have verification regimes or effective enforcement
mechanisms.2' Furthermore, the Protocol prohibits use of biological
on Biological Weapons Control, American Society for Microbiology). The major cause of
death in the world is infectious diseases, which kill approximately 17 million people every
year. See id.
13. See id. at 49.
14. See id. at 51.
15. See id. at 50.
16. See id. at 51.
17. See infra Part I.A-B. Practitioners identify the rules of international law by look-
ing to explicit, written agreements and the customary practices of nations, including consti-
tutional, legislative, executive, and judicial promulgations of states. See MARK W. JANIS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-6 (2d ed. 1993). Part I of this Comment
discusses several written agreements between nations. These agreements, whether styled
as treaties, conventions, or protocols are "essentially contracts between states." Id. at 9.
In this Comment, these terms are used interchangeably. For a thorough discussion of the
law of treaties, see JANIS, supra at 9-39. For an analysis of the relationship between trea-
ties and the municipal law of the United States, see JANIS, supra at 84-94.
18. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Protocol].
19. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter BWC].
20. See The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989: Hearing on S.993 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 28-29 (1989) [hereinafter Judiciary Hear-
ings] (statement of Ambassador H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of State for Polit-
ico-Military Affairs, Department of State) (commenting on the general situation with re-
gard to biological weapon proliferation and urging Congress to pass the proposed bill to
implement the United States' obligations to the BWC).
21. See BWC, supra note 19; Protocol, supra note 18; see also RANDALL FORSBERG
ET AL., NONPROLIFERATION PRIMER: PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR,
CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 69 (1995) (stating that the Protocol and the
BWC do not have verification or effective enforcement provisions).
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weapons only during war and only against other Protocol parties.22 The
BWC, unlike the Protocol, includes enforcement provisions.3 The effec-
tiveness of the BWC's enforcement provisions is questionable, however,
because the BWC does not include verification provisions to support al-
legations of violations.24
Congress recently strengthened 25 federal criminal laws and regulations
pertaining to bioterrorism26 but significant gaps remain. For example,
merely possessing dangerous pathogens is not a crime unless a prosecu-
tor can prove that the possessor intended to use a pathogen as a
weapon.2 Existing laws also do not address false reports and threats 29
and do not attach criminal penalties to handling pathogens in a reckless
22. See infra Part L.A (discussing the Protocol).
23. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 588-89, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167 (referring to
Articles V-VII, which set forth the BWC's enforcement procedures).
24. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the BWC).
25. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 511(d)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 1214, 1284 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) (amending several of the provisions enacted by the Biological Weapons Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-298, § 1, 104 Stat. 201 (May 22, 1989), and requir-
ing the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create regulations pertaining to the
control of dangerous biological agents).
26. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 175-178, 2332a (1994 & Supp. II 1997); Additional Requirements
for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 42 C.F.R. § 72.6 (1998); infra note
104 and accompanying text (discussing federal laws that prohibit assorted acts pertaining
to biological agents).
27. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of Robert M.
Burnham) (discussing law enforcement concerns about existing federal laws that crimi-
nalize acts pertaining to dangerous biological agents).
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1998) (prohibiting the knowing posses-
sion of dangerous agents for use as a weapon); Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra
note 5, at 62 (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno) (noting that merely possessing
biological agents without proving that the possessor intended to use this substance as a
weapon is not a federal crime). Current federal criminal laws pertaining to bioterrorism
do not take significant factors, such as having a felony record, into account. See id.
Criminal statutes must balance the need for public safety with the need for legitimate sci-
entific research on these agents. See id. A clear public safety concern arises, however,
when people who do not have scientific training or who have records of irresponsible con-
duct possess highly lethal substances, when they do not have a legitimate reason for having
such a substance. See id.
29. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 2332a(a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1998) (prohibiting the
knowing attempt or threat to violate the section, but not prohibiting hoaxes pertaining to
biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction); House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra
note 2, at 16 (statement of James Reynolds) (stating that existing laws do not address false
threats of bioterrorism, which are an increasingly growing type of threat). Current laws do
not capture false reports as threats because they require evidence that the terrorists actu-
ally intended to use biological weapons or to develop or possess biological pathogens in
order to use them eventually as weapons. See id.
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manner. ° Although there are biological and toxin agents that can cause
widespread and serious illness, current regulations only address lethal
agents.3
The federal government is currently spending vast sums to prepare for
a potential attack involving weapons of mass destruction,32 but the most
efficient as well as most cost-effective way to counter bioterrorism re-
mains to prevent it.33 To facilitate this objective, the United States De-
partment of Justice is drafting legislation that will strengthen current
laws pertaining to bioterrorism. This legislation will establish criminal
penalties for the unauthorized possession of biological agents that could
be used in biological weapons without a legitimate peaceful purpose, for
handling these agents unsafely, and for perpetrating a biological weapons
hoax.35 The Department of Justice worked closely with the Department
of Health and Human Services to ensure that this bill maintains the ac-
cessibility of dangerous biological agents for legitimate scientific re-
search.36
Part I of this Comment reviews current laws pertaining to the control
of biological weapons, including the Protocol, the BWC, the Biological
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (1989 Act),37 and the Antiterrorism
30. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 2332a(a)-(b); House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at
15 (statement of James Reynolds) (stating that current federal criminal law does not pe-
nalize people who handle dangerous substances in an unsafe manner, thereby consciously
disregarding and posing an unreasonable risk to public health and safety).
31. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of James Rey-
nolds). The current list of agents that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
regulates does not, for example, include Shigella or Salmonella. See id. In recent years,
however, terrorists have caused hundreds of people to become ill using these agents. See
id.
32. See Greenberg, supra note 2. Congress originally allocated $14 million to the
Department of Health and Human Services budget for bioterrorism preparedness, but
eventually added $144 million for this purpose. See id. The White House proposed to
provide this agency with $230 million for the next term for bioterrorism preparedness. See
id.
33. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of James Rey-
nolds) (quoting testimony by Dr. Margaret Hamburg on Mar. 25, 1999, before the House
of Representatives, who stated that measures that prevent bioterrorism are the most cost
effective ways to counter this type of terrorism).
34. See id. at 15 (stating that a crime bill that will improve existing federal statutes
pertaining to dangerous biological agents and toxins is currently undergoing finishing
touches).
35. See id. at 14 (listing the acts that the crime bill will criminalize).
36. See id. at 15. The Department of Justice's primary focus in creating the crime bill
is to make it easier for law enforcement officials to prevent bioterrorism. See id.
37. Pub. L. No. 101-298, § 1, 104 Stat. 201 (1990).
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (1996 Act).38 Part I then dis-
cusses the legislation that the Attorney General's office is currently
drafting to strengthen existing laws. Part II of this Comment argues that
existing laws do not sufficiently eliminate the threat of bioterrorism. Part
III of this comment asserts that criminalizing the unauthorized posses-
sion of dangerous agents, unsafe handling of these agents, and perpetra-
tion of hoaxes pertaining to bioterrorism would be more effective than
current laws in eliminating the threat of bioterrorism. This Comment
concludes by recommending that Congress promptly pass the Attorney
General's proposed legislation.
I. CURRENT BIOTERRORISM LAWS AND REGULATIONS
Two international instruments, as well as federal regulations and fed-
eral criminal laws, specifically pertain to the control of biological weap-
ons." The Protocol and the BWC are the primary international agree-
ments that specifically restrict the use of biological weapons.4 The 1989
Act implemented the United States' obligations to the BWC by creating
federal criminal laws that prohibit several acts of bioterrorism.41 Subse-
quently, Congress enacted the 1996 Act, which strengthened these fed-
eral criminal laws." The 1996 Act also required the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to promulgate and then to enforce regulations that
manage facilities storing and transferring highly lethal substances.43
38. Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511, 110 Stat. 1214, 1284 (1996).
39. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14-16 (statement by James S.
Reynolds) (noting that current federal criminal statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 2332a, as well as
current federal regulations do not protect the United States from bioterrorism suffi-
ciently); Judiciary Hearings, supra note 20, at 28-29 (statement of Ambassador H. Allen
Holmes) (noting the inadequacies of the two international agreements pertaining to bio-
logical weapons, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention).
40. See Elizabeth Smith, Note, International Regulation of Chemical and Biological
Weapons: "Yellow Rain" and Arms Control, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1011.
41. See 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1994 & Supp. III 1998) (stating that Congress enacted the
Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 to implement the United States' obliga-
tions to the BWC); Judiciary Hearings, supra note 20, at 5 (statement of Sen. Kohl) (intro-
ducing the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act for several reasons, including imple-
mentation the United States' obligations to the BWC, under Article IV).
42. See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
43. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 511(d)-(e), Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1284 (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to es-
tablish and maintain a list of dangerous biological agents and requiring the Secretary to
regulate these substances).
2000]
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A. International Bioterrorism Laws: The 1925 Geneva Protocol and the
1972 Biological Weapons Convention
1. The 1925 Geneva Protocol. Banning Use of Bacteriological Methods
of Warfare
Although people have used biological weapons for centuries," the first
international treaty banning the use of these weapons was the 1925 Ge-
neva Protocol.4' The United States signed the Protocol in 1925,46 and has
generally abided by its terms.47 However, the United States did not ratify
this treaty until 1975. 4 The Protocol merely states a rule of law requiring
44. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, TECHNOLOGY AND WAR: FROM 2000 B.C. TO THE
PRESENT 72 (1989) (stating that although the use of bacteriological weapons currently is
denounced, they have a long and honorable history); see also Joint Senate Committee
Hearings, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Sen. Shelby (R-Ala.)) (noting that one of the
earliest recorded attacks involving a biological weapon occurred in the 15th century, when
a Tatar force catapulted the bodies of victims who died from the plague into what is now
the Ukraine); Kupperman and Smith, supra note 4, at 37-38. More than 2000 years ago,
Greeks and Romans contaminated their adversaries' wells with corpses of victims of infec-
tious diseases. See id. Combatants also used biological agents during the Crimean War
and the American Civil War. See id.
45. See Alice I. Youmans et al., Questions and Answers, 83 L. LIBR. J. 195, 202 (1991)
(noting that the Protocol is more comprehensive than previous agreements pertaining to
chemical and biological warfare because this treaty specifically prohibits bacteriological, in
addition to chemical, asphyxiating, poisonous, or gas weapons). For a historical synopsis
on international agreements pertaining to chemical-biological warfare prior to the Proto-
col, see Youmans et al., supra at 199-203 and Smith, supra note 40, at 1031-33. The reader
can find treaties that existed prior to the Protocol as well as draft treaties of the Protocol
in 3 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE (SIPRI), CBW AND
THE LAW OF WAR: THE PROBLEM OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, 151-54.
46. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 571-72, 94 L.N.T.S. 72 (proclaiming that
the United States signed the Protocol at Geneva on June 17, 1925). See generally
FORSBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 69 (stating that as of January 1, 1994, 130 countries
were parties to the Protocol).
47. See LEONARD COLE, THE ELEVENTH PLAGUE: THE POLITICS OF BIOLOGICAL
AND CHEMICAL WARFARE 9(1997).
48. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 571-72, 94 L.N.T.S. 72. On December
16, 1974, the United States Senate consented to ratify the Protocol and on January 22,
1975, the President ratified the Protocol. See id. The United States deposited the Protocol
on April 10, 1975, whereby this treaty entered into force for the United States. See id.
The United States originally reserved the right to use prohibited weapons to retaliate
against enemies who used these weapons first. See id. However, the United States re-
scinded that reservation in January 1993. See FORSBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 69.
Commentators give different reasons for why the United States did not ratify the treaty
for almost 50 years after signing the Protocol. Compare Hoyt Gimlin, Chemical-Biological
Weaponry, 23 EDITORIAL RES. REP. 459, 463 (1969) (stating that the Protocol was pre-
sented to Congress during a time when the United States was in an "isolationist mood,"
that Congress did formally vote on the law, and that the treaty was withdrawn when, after
[Vol. 49:535
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humanitarian conduct during war.49 This instrument is not an arms con-
trol agreement, and therefore does not regulate the amount of bacterio-
logical weapons that its signatories produce or stockpile.'
The Protocol only applies to allegations of use of biological weapons
under certain circumstances." First, the Protocol only applies to confron-
tations involving its signatories. 2 But the Protocol's rule against use of
these weapons may reflect customary international law,53 and therefore
may apply to all nations." Furthermore, some parties reserved the right
a lengthy debate, it appeared that defeat was imminent), with JEANNE MCDERMOTr, THE
KILLING WINDS: THE MENACE OF BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 195-96 (1987) (asserting that
Congress did not ratify the Protocol because chemical manufacturing corporations suc-
cessfully blocked its passage), and Youmans et al., supra note 45, at 202 (contending that
the Senate did not ratify the agreement "because no efforts were made to lobby for the
Protocol or to educate the Senators to the terms of the document").
49. See Michael D. Diederich, Jr., "Law of War" and Ecology: A Proposal for a
Workable Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the Law of War, 136 MIL. L.
REV. 137, 146 (1992) (stating that various treaties, including the Protocol, prohibit use of
weapons that cause unnecessary human suffering and that use of these weapons is consid-
ered to be contrary to the laws of humanity, as well as to international law principles, dec-
larations, and binding agreements); Michael J. Matheson, ASIL International Law Week-
end: Panel on Internal Conflicts, 3 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 523, 526 (1997) (observing
that commentators often classify the Protocol as an arms control agreement, but that the
treaty is actually an important rule prohibiting the use of biological weapons in war);
Smith, supra note 40, at 1031 & n.134 (reporting that the international community created
the Protocol to prohibit use of weapons that inflict or prolong unnecessary suffering).
50. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1031, n.134 (stating that the Protocol does not try to
regulate the number or kinds of biological weapons that nations produce or stockpile).
51. See id. at 1040 (concluding that the Protocol only applies to unique circum-
stances).
52. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69 (declaring that the
Protocol's parties agree to the Protocol's terms as between themselves); Smith, supra note
40 at 1033 (noting that the Protocol applies only when all combatants in a confrontation
are signatories).
53. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38 (1)(b), 59
Stat. 1055, 1060, T.I.A.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (enunciating that one source of
international law is international custom, which is evidenced by regular practice that na-
tions accept as the law); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY, 223 (1998) (instructing that one form of international law is that which
is created from the customary practice of nations when nations practice this rule if these
nations believe that this practice is required by law). International customary law is bind-
ing on all nations. See id. at 224.
54. See SIPRI, supra note 45, at 15, 23, 26-27 (characterizing the rule prohibiting
biological weapons as customary international law). The Protocol states that the civilized
world condemns the use of chemical weapons in war, see Protocol, supra note 18, 26
U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67, but declares that the treaty's ban extends to biological
methods of war. See id. 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69. Nevertheless, since 1925, na-
tions have generally not used these weapons and nations have expressed commitment to
the ban on use of biological weapons. See SIPRI, supra note 45, at 23, 26-27 (stating that
the prohibition against use of biological weapons has become customary international law
since its creation); see also Matheson, supra note 49, at 526 (noting that many nations ac-
2000]
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to retaliate against enemies that use the prohibited weapons first.5 Sec-
ond, the Protocol applies only to the use of biological weapons in war; it
does not define the ambiguous term "war."56 If the Protocol's rule pro-
hibiting use of biological weapons constitutes customary international
law, this prohibition may extend beyond international armed conflicts."
Thus, the Protocol may also apply when a nation uses biological weapons
against another nation, even though the two countries do not recognize
each other as belligerents. 8 Third, the Protocol only applies when its
parties use agents, including biological weapons, that the treaty
prohibits. 9
The International Court of Justice (ICJ)6° may determine whether a
nation has violated the Protocol61 and then may fashion an appropriate
cept the position that the Protocol's rule against use of biological weapons reflects cus-
tomary international law); Smith, supra note 40, at 1041 (stating that the Protocol's prohi-
bition against use of biological weapons may reflect customary international law).
55. See Youmans et al., supra note 45, at 202 (arguing that one of the Protocol's
weaknesses is that it only operates upon mutuality and that its signatories reserved the
right to use biological weapons to retaliate against enemies who use prohibited weapons).
56. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69 (declaring that the
treaty's signatories agree to prohibit use of biological weapons during war); Matheson,
supra note 49, at 526 (stating that the Protocol only applies to use of the prohibited weap-
ons during war). See generally SIPRI, supra note 45, at 28-33 (discussing the meaning of
the term "war" in light of other international laws).
57. See Matheson, supra note 49, at 526 (stating that the Protocol applies solely to use
of chemical and biological weapons in war, but that some nations include internal conflicts
as well as international wars in this definition); Smith, supra note 40, at 1034-35 (stating
that the Protocol only applies to wartime situations, but that the treaty may or may not
apply to situations other than legally-declared war, such as civil war insurgents); see also
International Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia, Decision on the Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 7 CRIM. L.F. 51, 125-28 (1996) [hereinafter International
Tribunal] (explaining that several nations, including Greece, the United Kingdom, Ger-
many, and the United States, declared that Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its ci-
vilian population violated the Protocol).
58. See SIPRI, supra note 45, at 32 (noting that the international rule prohibiting use
of biological weapons in war seems to be a minimum standard and thus extends "to con-
flicts, not of an international character, and perhaps even in cases where the parties do not
recognize each other as belligerents.").
59. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69 (declaring that the
parties will not use bacteriological warfare methods); Smith, supra note 40, at 1033, 1035-
36 (contending that treaty violations are difficult to identify because there are language
differences between the English and French texts).
60. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 92-96; ICJ Statute, arts. 34-36, (stating that all nations
that are United Nations parties enjoy full access to the International Court of Justice and
must adhere to the court's governing principles); see also BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 302-03 (3d ed. 1999) (reporting that the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is the primary judicial organ of the United Nations and is com-
prised of 15 judges who serve nine year terms).
61. See ICJ Statute, art. 36(2)(c) (providing that nations may grant the court jurisdic-
tion to resolve whether an action constitutes a breach of an international law obligation).
2000] Bioterrorism: Perfectly Legal
remedy. 2 A party that alleges that another nation has violated the Pro-
tocol has the burden of proving such a violation to the court.63 The ICJ
prefers documentary evidence, but if the alleging nation does not have
this type of evidence, the court will scrutinize closely any circumstantial
evidence." The Protocol does not, however, include verification or en-
forcement provisions with which to acquire documentary evidence.65
Further, nations have not always complied with the ICJ's judgments, and
the United Nations Security Council has never enforced an ICJ judg-
ment.6 Consequently, if the ICJ holds that a nation violated the Proto-
col, the aggrieved nation may not be able to recover.67
Nations may use the international political process and the presence of
strong international norms against terrorist use of these weapons.6 The
international community, however, has not always supported the United
States' use of sanctions or force.69 Relying on America's potential adver-
saries to view offensive use of biological weapons as morally abhorrent
may not be realistic, and the fact that Americans view these weapons as
morally abhorrent may make bioterrorism more appealing to terrorists.7°
62. See id. art. 36(2)(d) (stating that nations may grant the court jurisdiction to de-
termine the type and extent of a reparation for a breach of an international obligation).
63. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1029 (noting that the ICJ generally requires alleging
parties to prove the alleged violation).
64. See id. (stating that the court may allow circumstantial evidence of an alleged
violation, but that the court scrutinizes this evidence closely).
65. See FORSBERG, supra note 21, at 69; Smith, supra note 40, at 1058 (indicating that
the Protocol does not specify the conditions under which parties or the United Nations
have authority to investigate alleged Protocol violations).
66. See CARTER, supra note 60, at 307-08 (citing examples of nations that have not
complied with ICJ judgments and noting that the U.N. Security Council has never taken
measures to enforce an ICJ judgment); see also FORSBERG ET AL., supra note 21, at 91
n.10 (stating that the United Nations has never taken official action against parties that
have violated the Protocol's prohibitions).
67. See id. at 306 (stating that affected parties generally have complied with the ICJ's
judgments, but that recently, some affected parties have not complied with these judg-
ments).
68. See SIPRI, supra note 45, at 18 (comparing sanctions for violations of domestic
laws to laws of war and noting that the types of sanctions that apply to the latter are "pro-
tests, international condemnation, political isolation, the risk of reprisals, the risk of sub-
sequent trial for war crimes, etc."); Smith, supra note 40, at 1058 (concluding that nations
rely on world public opinion and the international political process rather than on judicial
processes because international laws on biological warfare have extensive interpretational
problems).
69. See COLE, supra note 47, at 197-98 (listing international means of managing bio-
logical weapons and observing that the international community has responded inconsis-
tently to the use of sanctions or use of force against international law violations).
70. See ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that the United States intelligence
community did not recognize the growing potential for bioterrorism because that commu-
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In 1988, for example, several nations publicly condemned Iraq for vio-
lating the Protocol when Iraq allegedly used prohibited weapons against
Kurdish nationals.7' Despite these public condemnations, Iraq merely
reaffirmed its commitment to the Protocol without taking any substan-
tive remedial action.
2. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Resolving the
Protocol's Enforcement Weaknesses, But Not Effectively Curbing
Biological Weapons Proliferation
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Protocol remained the only international
agreement that prohibited biological warfare." During this time, a num-
ber of nations sought to expand and strengthen the Protocol 74 and pro-
posed draft agreements and resolutions. 7  The Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC), which complements and expands the Pro-
tocol, represents the fruition of these nations' efforts.76 The BWC bans
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of
biological weapons or biological agents in types or amounts that are not
justified for peaceful purposes.77
nity assumed that moral norms against offensive use of biological weapons constrains their
use by the enemy) ; COLE, supra note 47, at 217-25 (noting that, historically, the world
community has viewed biological weapons use as repugnant). The United States Army
continually faced difficulties in the 1950s and 1960s in trying to establish and maintain a
biological weapons program. See id. at 217-19. People view biological weapons with re-
pugnance partly because these weapons can kill large numbers of human beings indis-
criminately and partly because we constantly face a danger from naturally occurring bio-
logical agents. See id. at 219. This traditional view, however, does not mean that this
sense of abhorrence will continue. See id. at 221.
71. See International Tribunal, supra note 57, at 125-27 (quoting several nations'
declarations concerning reports of alleged use of chemical weapons by Iraq in September
1988).
72. See id. at 127-28 (stating that when Iraq denied charges of chemical weapons use
it also reaffirmed its adherence to the Protocol on September 17, 1988).
73. See Youmans et al., supra note 45, at 202. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union charged
the United States with violating the spirit of the Protocol for using tear gas and herbicides
during the Vietnam conflict. See id. Although the United States was not a party to the
Protocol at the time, Secretary of State Dean Rusk responded to this allegation by arguing
that these agents are not prohibited by the Protocol. See id.
74. See id. at 202.
75. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1042-43 (providing the history of the BWC).
76. See id. at 1041-42 (noting that the BWC resulted from almost twenty years of dis-
agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union over how to avoid some of
the Protocol's weaknesses); Diederich, supra note 49, at 146 (stating that the BWC ex-
panded the Protocol's restraints on biological warfare).
77. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166 (Art. I). See gen-
erally, Michael Moodie, Arms Control Programs and Biological Weapons, in BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS: WEAPONS OF THE FUTURE?, supra note 3, at 47. There have been three con-
ferences, held in 1979, 1986, and 1991, reviewing the performance of the BWC, and ad-
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Unlike the Protocol, the BWC is an arms-control treaty, rather than a
mere limitation on wartime acts. 8 Thus, the BWC's provisions apply at
all times, rather than in wartime only. 79 Furthermore, the BWC clearly
defines which substances, equipment, and means of delivery it prohibits.
8
0
Notably, however, more nations are developing biological weapons now
than before the BWC's creation."
To meet the BWC's goal of halting biological weapons proliferation,
the treaty includes provisions that allow its parties to address alleged
violations." Parties may consult and cooperate with each other on their
own or through help from the United Nations." Parties that believe that
other parties are violating the BWC may lodge a detailed complaint
stating all possible evidence of alleged violations with the United Nations
Security Council.8 This complaint must request the Security Council to
consider investigating the alleged violation.85 If the Security Council ini-
tiates an investigation based on the complaint, the parties must cooper-
ate with this investigation.86 The Security Council must report investiga-
dressing possible measures to strengthen its provisions. See id.
78. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1042 (comparing the BWC to the Protocol); You-
mans et al., supra note 45, at 203 (stating that the BWC is basically a disarmament treaty).
79. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166. Parties to the
BWC agreed, under article I, not to develop, produce, stockpile, procure, or hold danger-
ous biological agents in any circumstance. See id.; see also Theodor Meron, International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 574-75 (1995) (observing that
the Protocol may only apply to biological weapons' use during international wars and con-
cluding that the BWC is not as limited in its application, and applies against parties in any
circumstance).
80. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166. Under article I,
parties to the BWC agree to not develop or possess "[m]icrobial or other biological agents,
or toxins whatever their origin or method of production," as well as weapons, equipment,
or means that deliver biological substances or toxins. Id.
81. See id., 26 U.S.T. at 585-86, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 164-65 (stating that the BWC parties
are determined to achieve progress towards general and complete disarmament and to
completely exclude the possibility of use of biological weapons); COLE, supra note 47, at
4-5 (maintaining that biological weapons programs are growing as the number of signato-
ries to international agreements prohibiting these weapons increases).
82. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 588-89, 1015 U.N.T.S at 167 (articles V-
VII).
83. See id., 26 U.S.T at 588, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167 (declaring, in article V, that BWC
parties must consult with each other and cooperate to solve problems that arise regarding
the BWC's objectives or applications).
84. See id., 26 U.S.T. at 588, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167 (providing, in article VI(1), that
BWC parties that find that other parties are breaching their obligations to the BWC may
lodge a complaint with the United Nations Security Council).
85. See id.
86. See id. (stating, in article VI(2), that BWC signatories undertake to cooperate in
carrying out the Security Council's BWC investigations).
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tion results to all BWC partiesY
Critics of the BWC question the effectiveness of these enforcement
provisions because the BWC does not provide verification measures to
assess potential violations and relies instead on international political
pressure." Without sufficient evidence though, parties may be reluctant
to report an alleged violation when a nation has harmed its own citi-
zens." Furthermore, the lack of verification provisions permits violating
nations to deny other nations access to their lands, delay news of the in-
cident, and destroy evidence, thus thwarting the investigative process.90
A complaining party may have a particularly difficult time verifying an
alleged violation when a nation has taken advantage of biotechnological
advances that have decreased the potential for detection.9'
87. See id.
88. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1046. Although violations of the BWC may be diffi-
cult to prove, the BWC does not include mandatory verification requirements. See id.
The question of allowing for verification measures under the BWC, however, has proven
controversial. See Moodie, supra note 77, at 54 (noting the ongoing debate regarding the
potential effectiveness of a verification placed under the BWC). Commentators debate
whether verification entails highly intrusive inspections permissible at any time or should
merely require a demonstration of compliance. See id. at 54; see also Roberts, supra note
3, at 93 (noting that the various challenges pertaining to biological weapons use have
grown more pronounced, and that the proliferation of biological weapons and noncompli-
ance issues have resulted in an erosion of confidence in the BWC).
Commentators note that the BWC is limited in detecting and responding to violations in
view of the rising proliferation of biological warfare capabilities, particularly in Iraq and
Russia. See id. at 78. Iraq managed to evade international detection as it developed an
offensive biological weapons program, despite indications that something was amiss in that
country. See id. Similarly, the United States and its allies alleged that the Soviet Union
violated the BWC by providing its allies with biological weapons in the late 1970s, by using
these weapons in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and by possessing these weapons after the So-
viet Union experienced an anthrax outbreak in 1979. See id. at 79. The Soviet Union de-
nied these allegations. See id. at 80. In February 1992, however, Russian President Boris
Yeltsin acknowledged that past military efforts in the Soviet Union did not comply with
international treaties. See id. Commentators note that this acknowledgment raises doubts
about the BWC as a treaty that relies on international pressure to bring nations in compli-
ance with its provisions. See id. at 81. The fact that the international community could not
gather the political will to resolve allegations of BWC violations by Iraq and the Soviet
Union, or even try to secure compliance when the allegations later proved true, indicts the
international community itself. See id.
89. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1046 (noting that parties may be reluctant to report
incidents involving another nations' use of biological weapons against its own citizens if
the first nation does not have enough evidence to prove this allegation).
90. See id. (stating ways that a violating nation can thwart the investigative process).
91. See Thomas Dashiell, A Review of U.S. Biological Warfare Policies, in
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: WEAPONS OF THE FUTURE?, supra note 3, at 1, 5 (noting that
biotechnology advances increase the difficulty, and hence decrease the probability, of de-
tecting BWC violations).
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Commentators also criticize a BWC loophole92 that allows its parties to
possess dangerous biological agents and toxins for defense research or
other peaceful purposes.93 Critics claim that biological weapons testing
and research inherently create a substantial risk that the agents will es-
cape into the environment. 4 Likewise, nations easily could take advan-
tage of this loophole because developing agents for defense purposes is
operationally equivalent to developing agents for offensive purposes.95
On the other hand, a nation that genuinely conducts research on biologi-
cal agents for defense purposes may have a difficult time convincing oth-
ers that such research will not be used to develop offensive weapons.9,
Defenders of the peaceful research exception argue that governments
must be allowed to defend against biological warfare." Defensive re-
search reduces the number of casualties from a biological weapons attack
92. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 571, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166 (stating, in article
I, that parties to the BWC may not possess substances that could create biological weap-
ons "in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes").
93. See Victor W. Sidel, The History of Biological Warfare and Research, in POISON
IN THE WIND: THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, supra note 1, at
9, 13 (arguing that the BWC's exception for defensive or legitimate purposes creates a
loophole because the risk of release in the environment and biological weapons research
inevitably leads to more biological weapons); Smith, supra note 40, at 1046 (stating that
BWC commentators have expressed concerns that nations may, under this exception, jus-
tify possession of a large amount of these agents as immunizations for their citizens, but
then use these agents against their enemies). See generally Frank Barnaby, Chemical and
Biological Warfare, in FUTURE WAR: ARMED CONFLICT IN THE NEXT DECADE 106-13
(Frank Barnaby ed., 1984). Under this loophole, the Soviet Union probably did not vio-
late the BWC in 1982, as alleged by the United States, even though an explosion in a bio-
logical weapons research laboratory near Sverdlovsk resulted in an anthrax epidemic in
that region. See id. at 111.
94. See Rifkin, supra note 4, at 103 (noting that advertent or inadvertent release of
dangerous organisms into the environment could come about due to "human error,
equipment failure, terrorism, or natural disasters").
95. See David L. Huxsoll, The US. Biological Defense Research Program, in
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: WEAPONS OF THE FUTURE?, supra note 3, at 58, 62 (suggesting
that it is easy to obscure the line between offensive and defensive research on dangerous
biological agents); Smith, supra note 40, at 1046 (contending that nations easily could
breach the BWC's prohibition against possession of dangerous agents by having research
programs).
96. See Anthony Robbins, M.D., The Biological Warfare Program Should Be Abol-
ished, in POISON IN THE WIND: THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE, supra note 1, at 91, 96 (citing reasons that the United States should halt bio-
logical warfare testing). Dr. Robinson observes that research on offensive and defensive
uses of biological agents are functionally the same, concluding that it is impossible to
prove to other nations that the United States conducts this research for legitimate defen-
sive purposes. See id.
97. See Huxsoll, supra note 95, at 61 (stating that biological weapons programs are a
legitimate and legal method of preparing a nation for a biological weapons attack).
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and prevents technological surprise.98 Furthermore, many agents that
terrorists could use in weapons also occur in nature, and international ac-
cords should allow governments to examine and improve their ability to
deal with these agents.9
B. United States Laws and Regulations that Manage Dangerous
Biological Agents
1. The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989: Implementing
the United States Obligations Under the BWC and the Beginnings of
Criminalizing Bioterrorism
Before 1990, federal criminal codes did not regulate private citizens'
actions regarding biological weapons specifically. 10 Although the gov-
ernment could have prosecuted bioterrorists for murder for killing peo-
ple with biological weapons, the manufacture of a biological weapon was
not a crime.01 As a threshold matter, law enforcement authorities could
not prevent private citizens from building biological weapons. 1°2 The
Reagan Administration stated that extensive existing legislation pre-
vented private citizens from engaging in conduct prohibited under the
BWC. °3 These laws, however, do not cover biological agents and toxins
that the BWC describes, and do not implement the BWC's goal of eradi-
cating biological weapons.' Consequently, Congress passed the 1989
98. See id. at 61-62.
99. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 51 (statement of Dr. Ronald M.
Atlas) (noting that microbiologists use the same natural infectious diseases that could be
used to create biological weapons to develop means of reducing illness from these agents).
100. See Judiciary Hearings, supra note 20, at 8 (statement of Rep. Robert Kasten-
meier (D-Wis.)). In 1973, the executive branch encouraged Congress to pass legislation
that would prohibit and provide penalties for developing and acquiring biological weap-
ons. See id. Congress, however, did not consider this legislation because of the delay in
ratifying the BWC. See id. The 1980 legislative session ended before Congress could en-
act similar legislation. See id.
101. See id. at 5 (statement by Sen. Kohl) (citing the reasons that he introduced this
bill, one of which was to close the gap in the criminal laws pertaining to use of biological
weapons).
102. See id.
103. See id. at 8 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
104. See id. The Reagan Administration stated that "the Arms Export Control Act,
the Export Administration Act, Hazardous Material Transportation Act, Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, the Public Health Service Act, [and] the Federal Insecticide, Pesti-
cide and Rodenticide Act" controlled bioterrorism. Id. None of these laws, however, ef-
fectively prevent this sort of terrorism. See id. The Arms Export Control Act, for
example, gives the President authority to control the export and import of defense articles,
which includes biological agents. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994); 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (category
XIV) (1999). Unfortunately, neither the Act nor its implementing regulations defines
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Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 (1989 Act) to close the
gap in federal legislation controlling bioterrorism, thereby enhancing the
nation's safety.' This Act also fulfilled the United States' obligations to
the BWC.1°6
The 1989 Act created a new chapter in title 18 of the United States
Code that pertains solely to biological weapons crimes.'07 This chapter
contains four sections."1 The first section mandates fines or imprison-
ment for anyone in the United States who knowingly creates, transfers,
or possesses biological agents, toxins, or delivery systems in order to use
these items as biological weapons."°9 The United States has jurisdiction
over biological weapons offenses that are committed by or against
United States nationals."0
The second section of the 1989 Act gives the Attorney General
authority to search for and seize biological agents, toxins, or delivery sys-
tems that are held to create or transfer biological weapons."' The Attor-
ney General may search for and seize agents of the kind or amount that
are not justified for peaceful purposes. In emergencies, the Attorney
General does not need a warrant to seize and destroy these agents if
there is probable cause to believe that violators are using the agents as
"biological agents" clearly. See Judiciary Hearings, supra note 20, at 108 (supplement to
the testimony of Francis A. Boyle) (listing legislation that the Reagan Administration held
as sufficient to implement the BWC, and explaining why each act is not sufficient to im-
plement the BWC). Furthermore, the Act does not provide the government with ade-
quate regulatory authority over biological agent research and manufacture. See id.
105. See 135 CONG. REC. 16,501-02 (1989) (testimony of Sen. Kohl); Judiciary Hear-
ings, supra note 20, at 5 (statement of Sen. Kohl) (stating that one of the reasons he intro-
duced the bill was to close the loophole in the federal criminal laws that prohibits people
from killing with biological weapons but does not prohibit people from creating biological
weapons).
106. See Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-298, § 2(a),
104 Stat. 201 (1990); 135 CONG. REC. 16,501-02 (1989) (testimony by Sen. Kohl). Before
this Act, the United States fulfilled part of its obligations to the BWC by renouncing bio-
logical weapons and by destroying the nation's stockpiles of biological weapons. See id.
However, the United States did not completely fulfill all of its obligations to the BWC be-
cause it never took measures to outlaw biological weapons domestically. See id.
107. See Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act § 3(a), 104 Stat. at 201 (stating that
title 18 of the U.S. Code is amended by inserting a new chapter after chapter 9).
108. See id., 104 Stat. at 201-03 (setting forth four sections in chapter 10, titled "Prohi-
bitions with respect to biological weapons," "Seizure, forfeiture, and destruction," "In-
junctions," and "Definitions")
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (Supp. III 1997) (providing that those who violate this sec-
tion shall be fined, or imprisoned for life or any term of years).
110. See id.
111. See id. § 176.
112. See id. § 176(a).
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biological weapons."3  Alleged violators may defend their biological
agent, toxin, or delivery systems against forfeiture by presenting evi-
dence that these items are meant for prophylactic, protective, or peaceful
114purposes.
The last two sections of the 1989 Act provide for civil injunctions and
define several key terms."5 The 1989 Act gives the United States
authority to seek a civil injunction against those who commit actions
prohibited by the 1989 Act or against those who prepare, solicit, try, or
conspire to violate the 1989 Act."6 Alleged violators may defend them-
selves against such civil injunctions if their actions with respect to the
dangerous agents are justified for peaceful purposes."7 Finally, the Act
defines four terms: biological agent,"8 toxin,"' delivery system,"' and vec
tor.
121
When Congress introduced the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism
Act, the biotechnology industry stated that the industry supported the
bill, but expressed concern that the 1989 Act would impede legitimate
research.' Although acknowledging that the 1989 Act provides a de-
fense against the seizure of biological agents, 23 the biotechnology indus-
try argued that legitimate researchers would have the burden of proving
this defense. 4 The legislature responded to this concern by clearly stat-
113. See id. § 176(a)(2).
114. See id. § 176(c). In addition to a peaceful purpose, the alleged violator must show
that the agent, toxin, or delivery system "is of a type and quantity reasonable for that pur-
pose." Id. § 176 (c)(2).
115. See id. §§ 177-178.
116. See id. § 177(a).
117. See id. § 177(b) (stating that an alleged violator may present an affirmative de-
fense against an injunction by showing a peaceful purpose and that the type and quantity
of the material corresponds to such a purpose).
118. See id. § 178(1) (defining a biological agent as any microorganism, virus, or infec-
tious substance that can cause other living organisms to die or become ill, cause food, wa-
ter, equipment or supplies to deteriorate, or deleteriously alter the environment).
119. See id. § 178(2) (defining toxins as poisonous substances that living organisms
produce or poisonous isomors, homologs, or derivatives of these substances).
120. See id. § 178(3). Delivery systems include equipment or apparatus that are de-
signed to deliver or disseminate biological agents, toxins, or vectors. See id. § 178(3)(A).
A delivery system is also a vector. See id. § 178(3)(B); see also infra note 121 (defining
vector).
121. See id. § 178(4). Vectors are living organisms that can carry biological agents or
toxins to a host. See id.
122. See Judiciary Hearings, supra note 20, at 70-71 (testimony of Richard Godown,
President, Industrial Biotechnology Association).




ing in the bill's legislative history that the 1989 Act did not intend to pro-
hibit legitimate scientific research.' 2'
2. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996:
Responding to United States v. Harris and Strengthening Biological
Weapons Laws
In 1996, federal laws and regulations were still not sufficient to protect
Americans from bioterrorism 6 On March 12, 1996, Senator Orrin G.
Hatch (R-Utah) introduced the Biological Agents Enhanced Penalties
and Control Act27 (Biological Agents Act), which Congress eventually
incorporated into the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (1996 Act).'2 The Biological Agents Act sought to close gaps in the
criminal laws that made it difficult to prosecute people who buy patho-
gens without legitimate purposes and in the federal regulations that al-
lowed anyone to have dangerous biological agents."9 Like the 1989 Act,
the Biological Agents Act sought to balance citizens' needs to be pro-
tected from bioterrorism with researchers' needs to use pathogens with-
out having to meet over-burdensome regulations.19 The impetus for the
creation of the Biological Agents Act was a case involving the
125. See id. at 87-88 (statement of Sen. Kohl) (asking Mr. Godown if the biotechnol-
ogy industry would be more secure if the bill's legislative history clearly stated that the bill
did not intend to prevent legitimate research and receiving an affirmative answer); see
also 135 CONG. REC. 16,501, 16,502 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kohl). Senator Kohl em-
phasized that the drafters carefully crafted the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act to
ensure that legally valid researchers working with dangerous biological agents or toxins
are not targeted for prosecution mistakenly. See id.
126. See 142 CONG. REC. 1862 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
127. S. 1606, 104th Cong. (1996); see also 142 CONG. REC. 1862 (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (introducing the Biological Agents Act, noting the bill's purpose, and acknowl-
edging the bill's cosponsors: Senators Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), Diane Feinstein (D-Cal.),
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Mike DeWine (R-Ohio), Herb Kohl (D-Wis.), and Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (D-Del)).
128. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 6-7 (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein) (discussing current federal criminal laws pertaining to biological weapons); id. at 4-5
(statement by Sen. Kyl, discussing congressional efforts to combat bioterrorism).
129. See 142 CONG. REC. 1862 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator Hatch also noted
that federal regulations pertaining to the interstate transportation of agents that are
pathogenic to plants and animals are more strict than those regulating the interstate trans-
portation of human pathogens. See id.
130. See id. at 1863.
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unauthorized possession of dangerous pathogens, ' United States v. Har-
ris.1
3 2
In 1995, Larry Wayne Harris bought samples of the bacteria that
causes bubonic plague for what he claimed was legitimate research "to
counteract an imminent invasion from Iraq of super-germ-carrying
rats."'33 The court convicted Harris of fraudulently misrepresenting him-
self to the lab where he faxed his order for the bacteria.' 4 When Senator
Hatch introduced the Biological Agents Act, he noted that if Mr. Harris
had not used fraudulent misrepresentation to buy the substance, the
court would not have convicted him of anything because gaps in the laws
enabled anyone to obtain dangerous pathogens.'
a. Expansion of the Government's Capacity to Prosecute Crimes
Involving Biological Weapons
The 1996 Act amended the federal criminal statutes pertaining to bio-
logical weapons to update these laws with science and technology and to
ensure that bioterrorists will face severe and certain punishment!36 The
1996 Act accomplished these goals by amending three sections of the
1989 Act. 3 7 The terms "biological agent," "toxin," and "vector" under
131. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 4-5 (statement of Sen. Kyl)
(asserting that Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in
1996 as a response to the fact that Larry Wayne Harris acquired the bubonic plague bacte-
ria); 142 CONG. REC. 1862 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (referring to an incident in Las Ve-
gas in May 1995 without specially naming Harris).
132. 961 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
133. Id. at 1129, 1132.
134. See id. at 1129. Harris ordered bacteria that causes bubonic plague from Ameri-
can Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a Maryland company. See id. He misrepresented
to ATCC that he was qualified to order the bacteria by stating that he had an Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) certification number. See id. Harris also misinformed
ATCC by telling them that he had a small animals laboratory. See id. See generally COLE,
supra note 47, at 3-4. Harris ordered the bacteria a few weeks after the sarin gas attack in
a Tokyo subway. See id. After a police search in his home revealed racist and anti-Semitic
literature, as well as a certificate declaring Harris to be a member of a white supremacist
organization, a spokesmember for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith expressed
concern that Harris intended to use the bacteria for purposes other than against Iraq. See
id. at 4, 157. Harris entered a guilty plea to a wire fraud charge in exchange for the maxi-
mum six-month jail sentence. See id.
135. See 142 CONG. REC. 1862 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
136. See id. at 1862-63 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting that existing laws do not re-
flect current scientific and technological capabilities, and stating that the Biological Agents
Act would strengthen these laws by expanding the federal government's jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals who might take advantage of these current capacities).
137. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 511(b), 110 Stat. 1214, 1284 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 177-178 (1994)).
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the federal criminal code now include genetically altered products.'38 In
addition, there are criminal penalties for attempts, threats, or conspira-
cies to violate federal biological weapons criminal laws.'39 Finally, the
federal government now has authority to seek injunctions against those
who threaten to violate federal criminal laws involving biological weap-
140ons.
b. Criminalizing Genetically Altered Biological Weapons
The 1996 Act also amended the federal statute that criminalizes the
use of weapons of mass destruction.4 Under this section, weapons of
mass destruction include poison gas, weapons involving disease organ-
isms, and weapons that release dangerously high levels of radiation.' 42
Those who use, try to use, or conspire to use such weapons against
United States citizens who are outside of the United States, against peo-
ple who are within the United States, or against federal property in or
outside of the United States will face imprisonment or the death pen-
alty.143 The 1996 Act expanded this section by including the use of bio-
logical agents and toxins as they are defined in 18 U.S.C. § 178 in the
general prohibition against use of weapons of mass destruction, thereby
including genetically altered products.'"
c. Tightening Safety and Transfer Regulations
Aside from amending existing federal criminal statutes, the 1996 Act
also tightened regulations on transfers and possession of potentially haz-
138. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 178 (Supp. III 1998) (including biological products that can
be biotechnologically engineered to the provision's definition of biological agent), with 18
U.S.C. § 178 (1994) (limiting the definition of biological agent to microorganisms, viruses,
or infectious substances).
139. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (Supp. III 1997) (including attempts, threats, or con-
spiracies in the section's general prohibitions), with 18 U.S.C. § 175(a) (1994) (limiting the
section to prohibit the knowing development, production, stockpiling, transfer, acquisi-
tion, retention, or possession of the banned substances).
140. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 177 (Supp. III 1997) (including threats to engage in prohib-
ited actions pertaining to biological weapons in the list of acts the United States can obtain
a civil injunction against), with 18 U.S.C. § 177 (1994) (allowing the United States to ob-
tain a civil injunction against those who prepare, solicit, try, or conspire to engage in pro-
hibited actions pertaining to biological weapons).
141. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 511(c) (amending 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332a(a), which criminalized use of weapons of mass destruction).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(c)(2) (Supp. III 1997).
143. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
144. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 511(c) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a) (Supp. III 1997)).
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ardous biological agents. Before the 1996 Act, biological pathogens
were available to various legitimate users, yet anyone could legally pro-
cure these agents, as long as the sellers of the agents did not impose their
own limits.'4 Several federal agencies, such as the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency and the Department of Agriculture, regulated the man-
agement of these agents. 47 However, the regulations were developed for
narrow purposes in an era when most lawmakers did not consider do-
mestic bioterrorism as a realistic possibility.1'8 The agencies did not co-
ordinate their biological agents" 9 or keep up with advancing science.5
Therefore, these regulations provided an ineffective response to bioter-
rorism incidents.'
5'
Medical and research facilities must be able to ship infectious agents
because these agents are used to further medical research and to diag-
nose and treat infectious diseases.5 Communities must have adequate
145. See id. § 511(d)-(e) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
promulgate final regulations controlling biological agents within 120 days after the Act
passes).
146. See 142 CONG. REC. 1862 (1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). There were three
legitimate groups of biological agent users prior to the 1996 Act. See id. Clinical laborato-
ries could analyze small amounts of biological agents from patient samples. See id. Gov-
ernment and private scientists could use biological agents to conduct legitimate basic and
clinical research. See id. The Department of Defense could use biological agents to de-
velop protective strategies against the use of biological weapons in war. See id.
147. See id. (listing the various federal agencies that regulate biological agents, in-
cluding the Postal Service and the Food and Drug Administration).
148. See id. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
grouped biological agents into four classifications, ranging from agents that do not harm
humans to agents that are very harmful to humans. See id. at 1863. Regulations required
laboratories to manage each class of agents in a particular manner. See id. The CDC
promulgated this classification system to protect laboratory workers and to prevent the
accidental release of agents into the environment. See id. The regulations did not take
theft of the agents into account or attempt to prevent misdirection of dangerous agents to
terrorists. See id.
149. See id. at 1862.
150. See id. at 1862-63 (citing, for example, CDC regulations that did not address new
strains of organisms or provide an adequate definition of biological agent).
151. See id. at 1863 (quoting testimony by Dr. James M. Hughes, the Assistant Sur-
geon General and Director of the National Center for Infectious Diseases for the CDC,
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, in March 1996). Dr. Hughes testified that regula-
tions seeking to safeguard against the acquisition and distribution of agents pathogenic to
people are not comprehensive. See id. Although these regulations effectively control the
packaging, labeling, and transporting of these agents, the number of different departmen-
tal regulations do not effectively control the possession and transfer of these substances
within the United States. See id.
152. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 50 (statement of Dr. Atlas)
(noting that combating infectious diseases requires working with the same dangerous
agents used by bioterrorists).
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protection, however, from those who may steal the agents or intention-
ally divert the agents to terrorists, who could then use the agents to cre-
ate biological weapons."3 Therefore, the 1996 Act sought to ensure that
regulations governing the transfer of dangerous biological agents strike a
balance between assuring that medical and research communities have
access to these materials and preventing non-legitimate users from hav-
ing such access.
The 1996 Act mandated new responsibilities for the Secretary of
Health and Human Services.15 These responsibilities include establish-
ing and maintaining a list of biological agents that could pose a severe
public health and safety threat 16 and creating regulations for transfers of
listed biological agents."5 7 The 1996 Act specifically states that the Secre-
tary, in promulgating these regulations, must ensure that biological
agents remain available for legitimate uses.
58
d. Whether to Implement the Transfer and Disposal of Biological Agents
Requirements: Immediate Criticisms of the Efficacy of the Regulations
In response to the requirements the 1996 Act imposes on the Secre-
tary, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on June 10, 1996.' The CDC issued the
153. See 142 CONG. REc. 1863 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
154. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 23 (statement of Dr. Ste-
phen M. Ostroff, Associate Director of Epidemiologic Science, National Center for Infec-
tious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia).
155. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 511(d)-(f), 110 Stat. 1284, 1285 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 177-78) (requiring the Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services to regulate biological agents that could pose severe
threats to public health and safety).
156. See id. § 511(d), (f) (requiring the Secretary to establish a proposed list of all such
agents within three months after the Act's enactment and to promulgate a final version of
the list within six months). In creating this list, the Secretary must consider four criteria.
See id. § 511(d)(1)(B)(i). These criteria include the agent's effect on human health upon
exposure, how contagious the agent is, as well as methods by which the agent could be
transferred to humans, the availablity and effectiveness of immunizations against infec-
tion, and any other appropriate criteria. See id. The Secretary must also consult with sci-
entific experts from appropriate professional groups. See id. § 511(d)(1)(B)(ii).
157. See id. § 511(e). The Act directs the Secretary to create regulations requiring us-
ers to have proper training and appropriate skills before handling these agents and directs
the Secretary to provide guidelines for containinment and disposal. See id.
§ 511(e)(1)(A)-(B). The regulations must include safeguards preventing access to danger-
ous biological agents and procedures that protect the public safety in case a listed biologi-
cal agent is transferred in violation of the safety procedures. See id. § 511(e)(2).
158. See id. § 511(e)(4) (stating that legitimate purposes include research and educa-
tion).
159. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select In-
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final regulation on October 24, 1996 after a thirty-day comment period
and time for the CDC to consider the comments. 60 The final regulation
became effective April 15, 1997.161
The final regulation has several fundamental components.162 First, it
provides a list of select agents that pose a threat to public health and
safety. 63 Commercial suppliers, as well as those agencies, universities,
research institutions, individuals, and private companies that transfer or
obtain any of the listed agents16' must now register with the Secretary."'
fectious Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 29,327-28 (proposed June 10, 1996) (suggesting new regula-
tions pertaining to the acquisition and transfer of dangerous biological agents in accor-
dance with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act).
160. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select
Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,190 (1996) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72). The CDC received 67
written responses, many of which contained multiple comments and most of which were
favorable. See id. These comments focused on specific sections of the regulation, re-
quested clarification of particular provisions, or suggested that agents be added or deleted
from the proposed list. See id. Some commentaries stated that the regulation would not
protect the public against biological terrorism, would impede research, and would simply
provide unnecessary additional administrative costs and burdens. See id.
161. See id.; Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select
Agents, 42 C.F.R. § 72.6 (1998); Penalties, 42 C.F.R. § 72.7 (1998); Select Agents,
42 C.F.R. app. § 72 (1998).
162. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 23 (statement of Dr.
Ostroff) (noting that the new regulations include six fundamental components, including
registration of facilities and verification procedures, as well as a list of select agents that
are subject to the rule); 42 C.F.R. § 72.6-7, app.
163. See 42 C.F.R. app. § 72; see also Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at
23 (testimony of Dr. Ostroff). The CDC will supplement or modify this list of 40 select
agents as needed. See id. CDC based the select agents list on an existing list of infectious
agents regulated for export from the United States that can harm the public's health. See
id. Sen. Feinstein criticized the CDC for not including Salmonella typhimurium on the list
because terrorists previously used this agent to harm the public. See id. at 37. Dr. Ostroff
responded to this criticism by stating that placing this agent on the list "would be an exer-
cise in futility" because Salmonella is ubiquitous, existing naturally in poultry, as well as
other types of animals. See id. In a persuasive example, he noted that anyone can go to a
grocery store, buy several chickens, isolate the Salmonella organism, and then poison sev-
eral hundred people with it. See id. at 37-38. Dr. Ostroff concluded that continually add-
ing agents like Salmonella to the select list would not strengthen the regulations. See id.
164. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.60) (defining the term facility under the regulation).
165. See id. § 72.6(a)(1). The registration process involves certifying that facilities
meet minimum biosafety levels. See id. § 72.6(a)(2)(i). The Secretary may also require
facility inspections in order to ensure that facilities meet mandated biosafety levels. See id.
§ 72.6(a)(2)(ii), (g). Once approved, facilities receive unique registration numbers that
indicate that the facilities may work with listed agents at specific biosafety levels. See id.
§ 72.6(a)(i), (a)(2)(iii). The Secretary may deny registration to or withdraw registration
from a facility if there is evidence that the facility cannot handle these agents safely, that
the facility handles the agents unsafely, that the facility intends to use these agents in a
manner that could harm people, or that the facility is otherwise not complying with the
regulations. See id. § 72.6(a)(4). Facilities may appeal denial or withdrawal of registra-
tion. See id. § 72.6(b).
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Transferors and requestors of listed agents must now keep track of these
agents'' and comply with disposal and storage requirements. 7 Certain
agents, however, such as the less pathogenic vaccine strains of restricted
viral agents, are exempt from the regulations so that legitimate facilities
retain the ability to use them for reference, diagnostic, and research
studies."' In addition, the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amend-
During federal congressional hearings a year after the CDC promulgated these regula-
tions, Senator Kyl expressed concern that the CDC did not carry out the regulations'
mandate by registering facilities quickly enough. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings,
supra note 5, at 33-35 (testimony of Sen. Kyl and Dr. Ostroff). At the same hearing, Sen.
Feinstein expressed concern with the registration process, asking Dr. Ostroff whether the
CDC may delegate authority to register laboratories to private entities as noted in
§ 72.6(c). See id. at 35 (statement of Sen. Feinstein). Dr. Ostroff stated that the CDC dis-
cussed having an outside organization try to implement some aspects of the regulation, but
decided that it is most appropriate to keep these responsibilities within the agency. See id.
at 35.
Senator Feinstein also criticized the regulations for not including a provision requiring
that the CDC do a background check on individual employees who work with the select
agents. See id. at 35-36. She was concerned that another situation similar to the Harris
incident, which precipitated these regulations, could recur. See id. Dr. Ostroff stated that
it would be extraordinarily difficult to prevent people with criminal intentions from ob-
taining dangerous agents. See id. Dr. Ostroff noted, however, that the regulation has
safeguards sufficient to prevent another Larry Wayne Harris episode from occurring. See
id. at 36-37.
166. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(d)-(f). Transferors and requestors of select agents are re-
quired to complete an official transfer form and to provide specific information about the
request, such as the purposes for which the agent will be used. See id. § 72.6(d). Both par-
ties to the transfer must retain a copy of the transfer form, and the transferor must also
send a copy to a designated central repository. See id. § 72.6(d)(3), (f)(3). The purpose of
the form is to track the whereabouts of select agents, which is helpful in cases of illegiti-
mate access to the agents. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Re-
ceiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. 55,190, 55,192 (1996). Facilities do not have to follow
the regulation's transfer and verification requirements in order to transfer agents within
the facility if they maintain adequate records of such transfers. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.60).
Each registered facility must designate a responsible facility official who is authorized to
transfer and receive any of the agents listed, and who is either a safety manager or senior
management official of the facility. See id. The statute requires the responsible facility
official to take an active role in the transfer process. See id. § 72.6(d)(1)(iii), (d)(2), (e).
167. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(i)(1)(i) (stating that select agents must be "stored in accor-
dance with prudent laboratory practices"). The final rule explained that prudent practice
includes secure and controlled access to the area and to the equipment where the agents
are stored. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select
Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 55,193. In addition, facility officials must dispose of select agents
at the facility, using known effective methods. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(i)(1)(iii). Facilities
must maintain records of disposals and notify the registering agency that the agent was
destroyed. See id. at (i)(2). The final rule stated that the combination of facility manage-
ment oversight of the select agents, facility employee responsibilities, and stiff penalties
for violations of the regulation will ensure compliance with these regulations, See Addi-
tional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg.
at 55,193.
168. See 42 C.F.R. app. § 72 (noting exemptions to the list of select agents); Additional
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ments of 1988169 exempt certified laboratories from the regulations if they
use listed agents "for diagnostic, reference, verification, or proficiency
testing purposes."170
Although the CDC promulgated the regulations within the allotted
time under the Antiterrorism Act, the agency has not yet completely im-
plemented these regulations due to resource constraints. 7 ' The CDC re-
quested adequate funding in its 1999 budget, which should have resolved
this problem,"' but to date, many of the facilities managed by the regula-
tions are not registered."'
Commentators have criticized the regulations because of this lack of
full implementation, and have expressed doubt that the regulations will
deter bioterrorists even when fully implemented.1 4 The failure to fully
implement these regulations means that, for all practical purposes, the
United States' ability to control the transfer of dangerous biological
agents is no better today than before the 1996 Act.175 Furthermore, al-
Requirements for Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed. Reg. at 55,194 (re-
sponding to commentator concerns that this exception provides a loophole in the regula-
tion by explaining that the clinical specimen must be used for diagnostic, reference, or
verification purposes to be exempt). Toxins used for medical purposes or biomedical re-
search are also exempt from the select agents list. See 42 C.F.R. app. § 72.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 263a (1994).
170. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(h)(2).
171. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Dr. Atlas)
(stating that, as of May 1999, only half of the 300 institutions that possess listed agents are
registered with the CDC because the agency does not have sufficient financial resources to
register the additional 150 institutions); Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at
33-34 (testimony of Dr. Ostroff) (answering questions from Sen. Jon Kyl about the lack of
full implementation of the CDC's biological agents regulations). Sen. Kyl noted that, as of
March 1998, nearly 25% of the laboratories that should register with the CDC to have se-
lect agents were not registered due to a lack of CDC inspectors, and that none of the labo-
ratories had been certified yet. See id. at 34. Dr. Ostroff responded that, in order to raise
sufficient resources for the CDC to carry out the terms of the regulations, the CDC im-
plemented a user fee, which has deterred some of the approximately 200 facilities required
to register with the CDC from doing so. See id.
172. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 34 (testimony of Dr. Ostroff).
173. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 52 (statement of Dr. Atlas)
(urging Congress to provide the CDC with additional resources if the legislature expands
existing regulations because CDC has not yet fully implemented the current regulations
due to the present lack of sufficient resources).
174. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 14 (commenting that although the 1996 Act estab-
lished tighter controls over the transfer of biological agents, the CDC has not fully imple-
mented the regulations which would prevent terrorists from procuring lethal agents); see
also Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 38 (testimony of Dr. Carus) (noting
that, once implemented, the regulations may not prevent a determined perpetrator from
obtaining dangerous agents from a source other than those which are regulated).
175. See Sen. Jon Kyl, Opening Statement submitted to the Subcomm. on Tech., Ter-
rorism, and Gov't Info. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar.
4, 1998, (visited Feb. 10, 2000) <http://www.senate.gov/-kyl/sbiowep.htm> ("For all practi-
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though limiting access to dangerous agents,176 the regulations only cover
one means of obtaining these agents, which is through medical or re-
search laboratories.' Individuals who are not transferors or shippers of
these agents can therefore culture these agents in their home.7 Moreo-
ver, regulations cover lethal agents only, leaving nonlethal agents that
can harm people and cause widespread illness unregulated. 7 As a con-
sequence, the regulations' restrictions would not deter a dedicated perpe-
trator from procuring the means with which to create a biological
180
weapon.
C. Proposed Legislation: Finally Closing the Gaps that Enable
Bioterrorism
On February 19, 1998, enforcement authorities arrested Larry Wayne
Harris again, this time in Las Vegas, Nevada. 18 1 Harris possessed anthrax
bacteria, which turned out to be a harmless animal vaccine.82 Law en-
cal purposes, we today appear to be in the same position as we were in 1995 with regard to
the lack of controls over transfers of dangerous biological agents within the United
States"). The published text of the committee hearing does not contain this language. See
Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 4-5.
176. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 38 (statement of Dr.
Ostroff) (responding to questions posed by Sen. Feinstein concerning his level of confi-
dence in the regulations as a means of providing protection against bioterrorism, and not-
ing that the regulations help raise barriers to, and thus limit the acquisition of, dangerous
biological agents).
177. See id. (noting that obtaining dangerous biological agents legitimately is only one
method of obtaining dangerous biological agents); see also House Bioterrorism Hearings,
supra note 2, at 55 (statement of Dorothy B. Preslar, Washington Project Officer, Biologi-
cal Weapons Verification Project) (urging Congress to require facilities that possess listed
agents, rather than those that merely transfer or receive these agents, to register with the
CDC, and arguing that the government should impose stricter controls on individuals who
fall outside of the confines of registered facilities).
178. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 37-38 (testimony of Dr.
Ostroff). For example, a person could buy several chickens from a grocery store, isolate
the Salmonella organism, and poison hundreds of people with this bacteria. See id.
179. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of Mr. Reynolds)
(noting that CDC regulations do not cover potentially injurious nonlethal agents).
180. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 38 (testimony of Dr. Carus)
(stating that we should not mislead ourselves by believing that the regulations will prevent
bioterrorists from acquiring dangerous biological substances).
181. See The World Today (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 19, 1998) (transcript No.
98021901V23), available in LEXIS, News Transcripts (interviewing Mr. Harris, noting his
recent arrest in Las Vegas, and discussing his history of involvement with deadly agents).
182. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 1-3 (statement of Sen.
Shelby) (noting that information revealed after the Las Vegas anthrax scare showed that
the public's safety was never at risk); Roger K. Lowe, Nation Lags in Protection from
Biological Terrorism, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 1998, at 3B (reporting that Mr. Har-
ris boasted in Las Vegas that he possessed anthrax bacteria, but that the substance turned
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forcement authorities responded to this threat more quickly than they
did to threats concerning weapons of mass destruction a few years ago.'
13
Evidentiary requirements, however, delayed positive identification of the
strain for three days after authorities seized the agent from Mr. Harris.""
This delay could have prevented victims from receiving necessary and
timely medical treatment and would have caused unnecessary loss of
life."' This interdiction demonstrated that the United States is not ade-
quately prepared for a bioterrorist attack.' To correct this problem,
Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) stated that Congress should enact leg-
islation that would prohibit citizens from possessing biological agents in
the first place.i 7
On April 22, 1998 and on February 4, 1999, Attorney General Janet
Reno stated that the Department of Justice is developing a proposal to
amend federal criminal statutes pertaining to bioterrorism. 8 The Attor-
ney General stated that under current federal law, it is not a crime to
merely possess a substance that could be used as a biological weapon
unless a prosecuting attorney can prove that the possessor intended to
out to be anthrax vaccine).
183. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 64-65 (testimony of Louis J.
Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (stating that the government responded
more quickly and in a more efficient manner to the 1998 Las Vegas threat then they did to
a similar threat in New York in 1995).
184. See id. at 32-33 (testimony of Col. David R. Franz, deputy commander, U.S.
Army Medical Research and Material Command, Ft. Detrick, MD) (responding to ques-
tions from Sen. Kyl about the delayed response in identifying the biological agent from the
Las Vegas incident). Col. Franz testified that it takes approximately 30 minutes to identify
whether a substance is an infectious disease, but it takes several hours to identify whether
the disease is merely a vaccine strain. See id. at 32. He also noted that it takes time to
work through requirements imposed on laboratories; for example, researchers at the labo-
ratories cannot leave fingerprints on the evidence. See id. at 32-33.
185. See id. at 32 (statement of Sen. Kyl).
186. See id. at 36 (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (expressing concern about the contin-
ued availability of dangerous agents under the CDC regulations); id. at 41 (statement of
Sen. Richard H. Bryan (D-Nev.), noting that federal agencies still lack adequate resources
and personnel to respond effectively to bioterrorism); supra note 175 and accompanying
text.
187. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 6-7 (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein).
188. See id. at 62 (testimony by Attorney General Janet Reno) (stating that one of the
ways that the federal government intends to improve its ability to prevent and respond to
bioterrorism is to amend federal criminal statutes that pertain to biological weapons);
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Counter-terrorism Efforts: Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of Senate Appropriations Comm., 106th Cong. (Feb. 2,
1999) [hereinafter Senate Appropriations Hearing Comm.] (testimony of Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno) (stating that the federal government is reviewing the possibility of
amending federal biological weapons criminal laws to clarify the definitions under these
laws and to expand these laws to give the government better control over these agents).
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use the substance as a weapon.' 9 Criminal statutes that control biologi-
cal agents, the Attorney General explained, must strike a careful balance
between the public's need for safety and scientific researchers' need to
freely access these agents"9 She concluded that a clear public safety
concern remains when those who do not have the requisite scientific
training or have a demonstrated record of irresponsible conduct can le-
gally acquire and retain such dangerous substances.'91
On May 20, 1999, the Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime sec-
tion of the Criminal Division at the United States Department of Justice,
Jim Reynolds, stated that legislation that will criminalize the possession
of dangerous biological agents is undergoing finishing touches and will be
presented to Congress soon.' 2 The model for this crime bill was the
Chemical Weapons Implementation Act,193 which prohibits possession of
chemical weapons not justified by legitimate research.'94 The crime bill
proposes to keep dangerous biological agents and toxins out of bioter-
rorists' hands by establishing five new criminal penalties that will pro-
hibit hoaxes pertaining to biological weapons and prohibit unauthorized
possession of dangerous biological agents.9 This crime bill also reflects
an attempt to respect legitimate scientific researchers' needs to have ac-
cess to these dangerous agents.1' The Department of Justice worked on
the bill with representatives from the Department of Health and Human
Services to draft a proposal that will intrude minimally on the legitimate
research community.'9
Current law does not address unjustified possession of agents that are
not on the CDC's select list, but that are harmful and can cause wide-
189. See Senate Appropriations Hearing Comm., supra note 188 (statement of Attor-
ney General Janet Reno); Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 62 (statement
of Attorney General Janet Reno).
190. See Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Attorney
General Janet Reno).
191. See id.
192. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14-15 (statement of James
Reynolds).
193. Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. I, title II, subtitle A, § 201, 112 Stat. 2681-866 (1998)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 229-229F (Supp. IV 1998)).
194. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement by James Rey-
nolds); 18 U.S.C. §§ 229(a)-(b), 229F(7) (Supp. IV) (criminalizing possession and use of
chemical weapons but exempting authorized individuals from this law; defining purposes
not prohibited by this chapter as peaceful, protective, unrelated military, and law en-
forcement purposes).





Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 49:535
spread and serious injury.'98 The current list includes only highly lethal
agents." The crime bill thus proposes to criminalize the possession of
merely harmful agents in addition to listed and lethal biological agents in
types or quantities that are not justified by peaceful purpose.'0 For ex-
ample, neither Shigella nor Salmonella are listed on the CDC select
agents list because laboratories handle these agents routinely and be-
cause these agents are not highly lethal.' Nevertheless, bioterrorists
have used these agents to harm hundreds of people. 2'
Current law does not permit law enforcement officers to take action
against laboratories that do not have adequate safeguards to prevent bio-
terrorists from accessing dangerous biological agents, or to take actions
against home laboratories 2 3 that have grossly inadequate or nonexistent
safeguards.24 Hence, the crime bill creates criminal penalties for han-
dling biological agents unsafely and with conscious disregard for the
public's health and safety.205 This provision only attaches criminal penal-
ties when violators consciously disregard the public's health and safety,
198. See id. (stating that laws should manage unjustified possession of highly lethal and
other harmful agents).
199. See id. But see supra note 163 (explaining the consequences of adding ubiquitous
agents like Salmonella to the list of select agents).
200. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of James Rey-
nolds); see also id. at 53 (testimony of Dr. Atlas) (stating that any laws that propose to
manage dangerous pathogens should focus on penalizing possession in types or amounts
that are not justified by legitimate research). These biological agents are invisible and un-
detectable without sophisticated procedures, hence there is a chance that an individual
could be in techinical violation of regulations prohibiting possession without knowing it.
See id. For example, a person could pick up a dead deer mouse that has Hantavirus or a
jar of honey with Clostridium botulinum, not knowing that they are in possession of agents
included on the select list. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 15 (statement of James Reynolds). Recently, a hospital laboratory
technician spread Shigella, a bacteria that causes dysentery, over donuts and made nine-
teen people sick. See id. In 1985, members of a cult in Oregon caused hundreds of people
to become seriously ill by spreading Salmonella over restaurant salad bars. See id.
203. See id. In one instance in 1997, the FBI arrested Thomas Leahy for shooting his
son in the face. See id. at 19 (statement of Robert M. Burnham). The FBI discovered that
the basement in the Leahy home consisted of a makeshift laboratory. See id. Field tests
on the laboratory indicated that Leahy produced the biological agent ricin. See id. As a
result, the grand jury indicted Leahy for producing a biological weapon in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 175. See id. Further laboratory analysis determined that Leahy tried to culti-
vate botulism and mixed nicotine sulfate with a solvent, which was in a spray bottle. See
id. Leahy eventually pleaded guilty for violating biological weapons laws. See id. At that
time, federal prosecutors did not have sufficient evidence that Leahy intended to use the
nitrate sulfate as a weapon. See id.
204. See id. at 15 (statement of James Reynolds).
205. See id.
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but does not penalize negligent or accidental conduct.2°8
Existing federal regulations require entities that transfer and receive
select agents to register with the CDC,2°7 but do not reach individuals
who cultivate listed agents without transferring or receiving these
agents.2°8 The crime bill addresses this concern by requiring those who
possess select agents to report this to authorities so that authorities are
aware of who has these agents.209 This additional reporting requirement
is still under consideration, however, because the CDC has expressed
concerns that this type of a responsibility will conflict with the agency's
public health mission.1
Current federal criminal laws do not effectively address hoaxes re-
garding biological agents.21' Individuals can evade criminal liability by
claiming that they never intended to use the reported agents as a weapon
thereby stymieing prosecutors, who have the burden of proving intent
under current laws.212 The crime bill would deter hoaxes, which are an
increasingly common occurrence, 23 by criminalizing the knowing perpe-
211tration of hoaxes pertaining to biological weapons.
Finally, current federal laws do not restrict those who do not have sci-
entific training or those who have a record of irresponsible conduct from
possessing dangerous biological agents, even though these individuals do
not have legitimate reasons for possessing such agents. 5 Criminalizing
206. See id. (stating that this complements current regulations that relate to safety and
security).
207. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring of Receiving Select
Agents, 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(1) (1998).
208. See id.; Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 39 (statement of Sen.
Bryan) (questioning Dr. Ostroff about the CDC regulations and confirming that individu-
als who do not transfer or receive listed agents do not have to apply for registration).
209. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15-16 (statement of James
Reynolds).
210. See id. at 16 (noting that the Department of Justice is aware of the CDC's con-
cerns regarding the proposed reporting requirement).
211. See id.
212. See id. at 14, 16 (referring to the evidentiary requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 175).
213. See supra notes 8-11 and accompaying text (discussing the increase in hoaxes per-
taining to biological weapons).
214. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 16 (statement of James Rey-
nolds) (stating that the crime bill includes a false reporting provision); id. at 20 (statement
of Robert Burnham) (stating that legislation that criminalizes threats and false reports
pertaining to biological agents is an imperative deterrent to the cost of responding to these
false threats).
215. See id. at 15 (statement of James Reynolds) (referring to testimony of the Attor-
ney General on April 22, 1998 addressing this concern).
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the possession of listed agents by such individuals addresses this prob-
lem.2t 6
II. CURRENT LAW PERTAINING TO BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: FAILING
TO DETER THE DETERMINED BIOTERRORIST
Existing laws and regulations manage biological agents that can be
217used to create biological weapons in three different ways. These laws
prohibit use of these weapons during war,"' prohibit possession in
amounts or types that cannot be justified by peaceful purposes or for use
as weapons,21 ' and regulate transferors and shippers of these highly lethal
agents.22 The United States, however, still remains susceptible to bioter-
rorism.22'
A. Banning Use of Biological Weapons: Applying the 1925 Geneva
Protocol to Bioterrorism
According to the Protocol's terms, this treaty only bans use of biologi-
cal weapons during wartime situations involving parties to the Protocol.222
The Protocol's ban may not be so limited, though, as this treaty may re-
flect customary international law.2 3 Thus, the Protocol's rule that pro-
216. See id.
217. See discussion supra Part I (discussing international instruments and federal laws
and regulations that manage dangerous biological agents).
218. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 69 (extending the
prohibition against wartime use of prohibited weapons to use of bacteriological methods
of war).
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 175 (Supp. III 1997) (prohibiting the knowing possession of bio-
logical agents, toxins, or delivery systems for use as a weapon); BWC, supra note 19, art. I,
26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166 (prohibiting possession in amounts or types that
cannot be justified by peaceful or defensive purposes).
220. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select
Agents, 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(1) (1998) (requiring facilities that transfer or ship highly lethal
agents to register with the CDC).
221. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 12 (testimony of James Rey-
nolds) (noting that numerous law enforcement officials involved with counterterrorism,
academics, and health care professionals agree that the potential use of a biological
weapon is the most serious form of terrorist threat currently faced by the United States);
see id. at 16 (testimony of Robert Burnham) (stating that existing laws pertaining to bio-
terrorism have significant gaps); see Anderson, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that America
remains susceptible to bioterrorism).
222. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67, 69 (proclaiming
that the signatories condemn use of the Protocol's prohibited agents in war and extending
its prohibition to bacteriological methods of war).
223. See supra notes 53-54, 57-58 and accompanying text (classifying the Protocol's
prohibition against use of biological weapons as customary international law, therefore
applying at all times rather than merely during international strife, and applying to all na-
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hibits use of these weapons may apply against nations that are not at war
with the United States, but that attack the United States with biological
weapons. 4 Furthermore, the Protocol's prohibition may apply against
violating nations that are not parties to the Protocol.225
Even if the Protocol's rule against use of biological weapons applies to
a bioterrorist attack against the United States, its prohibition will proba-
bly not prevent other nations from committing bioterrorist acts against
the United States. At the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
United States would bear the burden of proving that another nation
committed an act of bioterrorism on United States soil.226 Yet, biological
weapons attacks are difficult to detect,27 and the Protocol does not give
accusing nations the right to verify allegations of violations.m Thus, the
United States would probably not be able to obtain this preferred docu-
mentary evidence. 29 Inevitably, the United States would have to rely on
circumstantial evidence, which the ICJ would scrutinize closely.2 Thus,
a nation that commits bioterrorism against the United States would
probably prevail against such allegations at the ICJ. Even if the United
States manages to prevail against a violating nation at the ICJ, this nation
may not comply with the ICJ's resulting judgment.231 Furthermore, the
U.N. Security Council will probably not enforce the ICJ's judgment, be-
cause it has never done so before. 2
The United States cannot protect its citizens from bioterrorist attacks
by relying on international law remedies or expecting that other nations
will view biological weapons as morally abhorrent23 This is because
other nations have not always supported the United States' use of sanc-
tions rather than only to parties to the Protocol).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that nations that allege that
other nations violated international obligations bear the burden of proving these viola-
tions before the ICJ).
227. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 6, 8 (discussing the difficulties of detecting biologi-
cal weapon attacks).
228. See Protocol, supra note 18, 26 U.S.T. at 575, 94 L.N.T.S. at 67, 69 (prohibiting
use of biological weapons, but not providing enforcement or verification measures).
229. See supra text accompanying note 64 (noting that the IJ prefers documentory
evidence).
230. See id.
231. See supra text accompanying note 66 (noting that, historically, some nations have
not complied with ICJ judgments).
232. See id. (stating that the U.N. has never enforced ICJ judgments).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 69-70 (discussing the unreliability of use of
sanctions, force, or overly relying on other nations to view biological weapons with abhor-
rence).
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tions or force in response to violations of international obligations.
Unlike the United States, not all nations necessarily view biological
weapons with repugnance. 23 Thus, the United States cannot rely on the
Protocol's rule against use of biological weapons to protect its citizens
from bioterrorism.
B. Prohibiting Possession in Types or Quantities Unjustified by Peaceful
Purposes: The Biological Weapons Convention and 18 U.S.C. §§ 175, 2332c
1. The Biological Weapons Convention
The BWC prohibits nations from possessing biological weapons and
from transferring biological weapons or biological weapons expertise to
other nations or individuals. 23'6 Nevertheless, the BWC permits nations to
possess dangerous biological agents for peaceful or defensive research.237
Unlike the Protocol, the BWC includes provisions that allow nations to
enforce its obligations. 38 Like the Protocol, however, the BWC does not
effectively prevent bioterrorism on United States soil. This is because
the BWC does not support its enforcement articles with provisions al-
lowing other nations to verify such violations. 39  Furthermore, the
BWC's exception for defense or peaceful research, valid or not, ° creates
a loophole that rogue nations can manipulate to create biological weap-
ons.24 Even if these nations do not intend to use such weapons, increas-
ing the number of biological weapons in the world increases the possibil-
ity that the United States will face a bioterrorist attack.2
234. See supra text accompanying note 69.
235. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 9 (stating that potential United States adversaries
may not view biological weapons with the same abhorrence as Americans).
236. See BWC, supra note 19, 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166, 167 (stating, in
article I, that parties to the BWC agree not to acquire or retain the types or amounts of
biological agents or toxins that are not justified for peaceful purposes or biological weap-
ons, equipment or means of delivery, and stating, in article III, that parties to the BWC
agree not to transfer these agents or weapons to any recipient).
237. See id. 26 U.S.T. at 587, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 166 (art. I).
238. See id. 26 U.S.T. at 588-89, 1015 U.N.T.S. at 167 (art. V-VII).
239. See FORSBERG ET AL., supra note 21.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 92-99 (discussing criticisms and defenses of
the exception/loophole).
241. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95 (noting problems with the loophole in
the BWC that allows for peaceful research).
242. See supra text accompanying note 5 (stating that the likelihood of bioterrorism
rises as the number of nations with biological weapons programs rises).
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2. Federal Criminal Laws
The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 created federal
criminal laws prohibiting biological weapons and the 1996 Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act strengthened these laws.243 These laws
implement the United States' obligations to the BWC by creating crimi-
nal penalties for violating the treaty's prohibition against possession of
biological agents in types or quantities not justified by legitimate re-
search.2" These laws now extend to possession of genetically altered
biological agents and criminalize attempts, threats, or conspiracies to use
these weapons.4' Furthermore, federal criminal laws give the federal
government authority to seize biological agents from individuals who
create or transfer biological weapons and from individuals who threaten
to violate biological weapons laws. 46
Like the BWC, this type of prohibition does not deter acts of bioter-
rorism in the United States effectively because there are too many gaps
in these laws that permit the determined bioterrorist to commit such acts
legally."7 These laws do not criminalize false reports pertaining to bio-
logical weapons attacks.2" Nor do federal criminal laws prohibit indi-
viduals from possessing dangerous pathogens or toxins, even though such
individuals may have criminal backgrounds or records of irresponsible
conduct.249 These laws do not penalize individuals who handle these dan-
gerous agents unsafely and with conscious disregard for the public's
health and safety?" This particular gap prevents law enforcement offi-
cials from responding to laboratories and basement operations that do
243. See discussion supra Parts I.B.1, I.B.2.a-b (discussing the changes that the 1989
and 1996 Acts made to federal criminal laws pertaining to biological weapons).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 175 note (Supp. III 1997) (stating that the law implements inter-
national obligations prohibiting possession of biological weapons unjustified by legitimate
research).
245. See id. §§ 175, 2332a (prohibiting possession of biological weapons and weapons
of mass destruction, respectively, and including genetically-altered agents).
246. See id. § 177(a).
247. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14-16 (statement of James
Reynolds) (noting the deficiencies of current laws with respect to preventing bioter-
rorism).
248. See id. at 16.
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 175 (prohibiting only possession is not justified by legitimate re-
search); Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno).
250. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of James Rey-
nolds); Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Attorney Gen-
eral Janet Reno).
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251not have adequate safeguards to prevent bioterrorist access to agents.
C. Regulating Facilities That Transfer and Ship Highly Lethal Substances:
CDC Regulations
The 1996 Act required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to
create regulations requiring transferors and shippers to register with the
CDC, keep track of these agents, and comply with disposal and storage
requirements 25 ' Aside from the fact that the CDC has not yet fully im-
plemented these regulations, 23 they fall short of protecting the United
214States from bioterrorism because individuals who do not transfer or
ship dangerous agents do not have to comply with them. 5 These regula-
tions do not regulate individuals with home laboratories 6 and thus do
not protect the United States from a bioterrorist attack any more than it
was protected before the 1996 Act.
2 7
III. PROVIDING THE PROPER BALANCE FOR PUBLIC SAFETY WHILE
PRESERVING THE RIGHT TO CONDUCT PEACEFUL RESEARCH
Current laws pertaining to the management of dangerous pathogens
and toxins do not effectively prevent bioterrorism on United States
soil.28 This is because these laws require prosecutors to show a nexus be-
tween possession of biological agents and an attempt to use these agents
as weapons. 2" Furthermore, relevant regulations solely govern transfer-
251. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of James Rey-
nolds).
252. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§ 511 (d)-(f), 110 Stat. 1214, 1284-85.
253. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete implemen-
tation of the regulations).
254. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14-15 (statement of James
Reynolds) (listing problems with current regulations pertaining to the management of
biological agents).
255. See Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select
Agents, 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(1) (1998) (requiring only facilities that transfer and ship select
agents to register with the Secretary of Health and Human Services).
256. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (statement of James Rey-
nolds) (referring to Thomas Leahy).
257. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting Sen. Kyl).
258. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14-15 (statement of James
Reynolds) (noting that existing laws contain gaps that increase the likelihood of a bioter-
rorist attack in the United States).
259. See 18 U.S.C. § 175 (Supp. III 1997) (prohibiting possession of biological agents
for use as a weapon); Joint Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of
Attorney General Janet Reno).
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ors and shippers of these agents. 26° Legislation that prohibits individuals
who are not conducting legitimate research from possessing dangerous
agents and legislation that criminalizes false reports pertaining to bio-
logical weapons, however, would deter bioterrorism.26'
A. Criminalizing Individual Possession Protects the Public from
Bioterrorism
Measures that deter or prevent bioterrorism are the most effective
ways to combat bioterrorism. 2 One method of deterring or preventing
bioterrorism is to gain better control over who possesses the types of
substances that could be used to create these weapons.2 63 Thus, federal
criminal laws should simply prohibit individuals from possessing these
agents absent authority from the CDC, rather than requiring a prosecu-
tor to show that the individual intended to use this agent to harm oth-
264ers.
Another way to deter bioterrorism is to give the federal government
better control over the handling of these agents.25 Unregulated agents in
laboratories that do not transfer or receive listed agents could fall into
the hands of a bioterrorist, and unsafe handling of these agents could ex-
pose populations to disease.266 Thus, federal laws should criminalize un-
safe handling of these agents and require individuals or facilities that
possess these agents to report this possession to the appropriate authori-
260. See 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(1) (1998) (providing that facilities must register with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services prior to shipping or receiving select agents).
261. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of James Rey-
nolds) (noting that the best way to prevent bioterrorism is to improve existing federal
criminal statutes by criminalizing individual possession of biological agents); Joint Senate
Committee Hearings, supra note 5, at 62 (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno)
(stating that the federal government has improved its ability to address bioterrorism since
1995, but that this ability could be improved further by criminalizing individual possession
of dangerous substances).
262. See House Bioterrorim Hearings, supra note 2, at 14 (statement of James Rey-
nolds).
263. See id. at 15-16; see also id. at 53 (testimony of Dorothy Preslar) (suggesting ways
to prevent bioterrorism, one of which is to strictly control individual possession of danger-
ous substances); id. at 58-59 (statement of Nancy Connell) (suggesting ways to improve
current regulations preventing bioterrorism, and stating that individuals should not have
access to these substances).
264. See id. at 58-59.
265. See id. at 15 (statement of James Reynolds) (stating that one way to give the gov-
ernment more control after the handling of biological agents is to impose criminal penal-
ties on individuals or laboratories that handle agents unsafely or do not have sufficient
safeguards to protect the United States against bioterrorism).
266. See id.
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ties.267
Another way to prevent bioterrorism in the United States is to close
the gap in current federal criminal laws that allow bioterrorists to perpe-
trate hoaxes pertaining to biological agents without repercussions.2'6 Re-
sponding to false reports requires vast sums of money and resources, and
potentially desensitizes populations to actual attacks.2 69 Thus, federal
laws should criminalize threats regarding biological agents.270
B. Laws Criminalizing Individual Possession in Types or Amounts
Unjustified by Legitimate Research Preserves Legitimate Researchers'
Ability to Use These Agents
Federal laws that prohibit unauthorized individual possession of dan-
gerous substances of the types or quantities unjustified by legitimate re-
search would not prevent legitimate scientists and researchers from ac-
cessing the types of substances they need to improve health care or
defenses against bioterrorism.27' The Secretary of Health and Human
Services would register and authorize legitimate laboratories."' Fur-
thermore, federal criminal laws would solely criminalize possession of
agents in the types or amounts that are not justified by legitimate re-
search.273
IV. CONCLUSION
Current laws and regulations governing biological weapons are insuffi-
cient to deter bioterrorists from making false reports about biological
agents, from buying dangerous pathogens or toxins, and then creating
biological weapons. Granted, there are valid reasons for having such
agents, and researchers and those in the medical arena who legitimately
need these agents should not fear prosecution for such possession. How-
ever, the government should not allow individuals who are not qualified
to have dangerous biological agents to possess them. Exposure to these
agents, purposefully or accidentally, can kill or incapacitate huge popula-
267. See id.
268. See id. at 20 (statement of Robert M. Burnham) (asserting an imperative need for
legislation prohibiting false reports regarding biological agents to deter the large amount
of resources and money being spent by the government to respond to these hoaxes).
269. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text (discussing ramifications of the in-
creasing number of hoaxes pertaining to biological agents).
270. See id.
271. See House Bioterrorism Hearings, supra note 2, at 15-16 (statement of James
Reynolds).
272. See id. at 14.
273. See id. at 15.
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tions. Furthermore, those who create hoaxes about biological weapons,
thereby causing cities to spend vast sums of money to respond, should
face criminal prosecution. Congress should criminalize the possession of
harmful and lethal pathogens and toxins that could be used as biological
weapons in amounts not justified by legitimate purposes and should
criminalize hoax perpetration regarding these agents.
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